Internet Infrastructure Review Nov.2015 Vol. 29

Infrastructure Security

Route Hijacking

Content Delivery

IIJ Initiatives Following the Advent of IP-Enabled Broadcast Equipment

Internet Topics

Modular Data Center Developments

Internet Initiative Japan

Internet Infrastructure Review November 2015 Vol.29

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Executive Summary

Executive Summary

I recently attended Telecom World 2015, which was held in Budapest, Hungary. While there, I walked the picturesque townscape that stretches out along both banks of the Danube River, and experienced the rich history and culture of the region. Most exhibitors at this event held by ITU are vendors and telecommunications carriers. This time Chinese companies provided backing, and there was a significant presence from Africa and Central Asia, while I noticed fewer exhibits from Western and Asian countries. Telecom events were once places where telecommunications carriers introduced their services and conducted business talks, but it hit me that this seems to have been supplanted by the Internet, revolving around Internet technology-based systems and the matching of Internet-savvy startup companies. I am gaining a new understanding of the fact that the Internet is no longer treated as special, and has become a form of communications infrastructure readily available for anyone to use. I returned home convinced that more than ever there is a need for constant vigilance when it comes to maintaining the security of this infrastructure.

This report discusses the results of the various ongoing surveys and analysis activities that IIJ, as a service provider, carries out to support the Internet and cloud infrastructure, and enable our customers to continue to use them safely and securely. We also regularly present summaries of technological development as well as important technical information.

In Chapter 1, we focus on the incidents that occurred day-to-day. Recently, the severity of DDoS attacks seems to be escalating, including cases that stem from criminal intent or political messages. In light of this, we look at route hijacking in our focused research. I believe this will give some insight into the roles of those who work behind the scenes to manage IP addresses and ensure Internet reachability.

In Chapter 2, we put a spotlight on technology for content delivery. Relay broadcasts of sports and music events are often seen on TV, but we carry out content delivery using high-capacity backbone lines. In addition to discussing the 4K/8K transmission tests we are carrying out in anticipation of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games, we also consider future trends.

In the Internet Topics section, we covered the topic of modular data centers. This idea is similar to electronic blocks that combine functional blocks as a new method for creating infrastructure. We have begun working on new concepts for data centers that proactively use outside-air cooling, and have also received orders from overseas for configurations that are now running stably in a range of environments. Here we examine the events leading up to this and the accumulated knowledge involved.

Through activities such as these, IIJ continues to strive towards improving and developing our services on a daily basis, while maintaining the stability of the Internet. We will keep providing a variety of services and solutions that our customers can take full advantage of as infrastructure for their corporate activities.



Yoshikazu Yamai

Mr. Yamai is an Executive Managing Officer of IIJ and Director of the Service Operation Division. Upon joining IIJ in June 1999, he was temporarily transferred to Crosswave Communications, Inc., where he was engaged in WDM and SONET network construction, wide-area LAN service planning, and data center construction, before returning to his post in June 2004. Since then he has managed IIJ's Service Operation Division as Director. He also heads IIJ's data center operations, and he played a key role in the establishment of the modular "Matsue Data Center Park," which was the first in Japan to use outside-air cooling.

Route Hijacking

1.1 Introduction

This report summarizes incidents to which IIJ responded, based on general information obtained by IIJ itself related to the stable operation of the Internet, information from observations of incidents, information acquired through our services, and information obtained from companies and organizations with which IIJ has cooperative relationships. This volume covers the period of time from July 1 through September 30, 2015. In this period a number of hacktivism-based attacks were once again carried out by Anonymous and other groups, and there were frequent incidents that included many DDoS attacks, information leaks caused by unauthorized access, and website defacements. In an incident in which an Italian security firm was attacked, 400 GB of internal information was leaked, including the details of vulnerabilities in a number of other companies' software products for which no fixes were available until the vendors fixed them later. There was also a rash of incidents of unauthorized access and resulting information leaks and website alterations. In several incidents in Japan, websites were exploited as stepping stones in targeted attacks. These examples show that many security-related incidents continue to occur on the Internet.


1.2 Incident Summary

Here, we discuss the IIJ handling and response to incidents that occurred between July 1 and September 30, 2015. Figure 1 shows the distribution of incidents handled during this period*¹.

The Activities of Anonymous and Other Hacktivists

Attacks by hacktivists such as Anonymous continued during this period. DDoS attacks and information leaks occurred at government-related and corporate sites in a large number of countries stemming from a variety of incidents and causes.

During this survey period, individuals and organizations thought to be associated with ISIL or sympathetic to its principles continued to carry out website defacements and SNS account hijackings around the world. In July, the website of a human rights watchdog in Syria was defaced. Defacements were also made to a NATO-related site in Georgia for supporting Jordan, and Malaysian police accounts on SNS sites such as Facebook and Twitter were hijacked. A number of other attacks were made on the Internet in response to circumstances and unrest caused by conflicts or diplomatic issues.



(July 1 to September 30, 2015)

Multiple attacks were also made in protest against the government-led regulation of the Internet and communications. In Canada, there were incidents such as DDoS attacks and leaks of internal information due to the compromise of servers at a number of government agencies, including local administrative bodies, stemming from outcry against an anti-terror bill passed into law in June (OpC51). In India, a telecommunications carrier funded by the Indian government was accessed without authorization, leading to damages including the leak of account information for over 30 million users, in protest against government moves to strengthen Internet regulations in India (OpIndia). In Vietnam, Government-related websites were defaced in protest against online censorship carried out by the government. Similarly, the

Other: Security-related information, and incidents not directly associated with security problems, including highly concentrated traffic associated with a notable event.

^{*1} Incidents discussed in this report are categorized as vulnerabilities, political and social situations, history, security incidents or other.

Vulnerabilities: Responses to vulnerabilities associated with network equipment, server equipment or software commonly used over the Internet or in user environments.

Political and Social Situations: Responses to incidents related to domestic and foreign circumstances and international events such as international conferences attended by VIPs and attacks originating in international disputes.

History: Historically significant dates; warning/alarms, detection of incidents, measures taken in response, etc., related to attacks in connection with a past historical fact

Security Incidents: Unexpected incidents and related responses such as wide propagation of network worms and other malware; DDoS attacks against certain websites.



website of the National Telecommunications Commission in the Philippines was also defaced. In Thailand, DDoS attacks were made on a number of government-related websites in protest against stricter national censorship of communications.

In Japan, DDoS attacks thought to have been perpetrated by Anonymous as part of protests against the drive hunting of dolphins and small whales temporarily rendered the website of Taiji-cho in Wakayama Prefecture inaccessible (OpKillingBay). Attacks associated with this operation continued into October, targeting the websites of related organizations, government agencies, airports, and news outlets. Because attacks have also spread to organizations without a clear connection to the protests at the time of writing, caution must be exercised.

In Canada, there were DDoS attacks targeting the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) after they shot to death a member of Anonymous who was protesting the construction of a dam for hydroelectric power generation. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was also compromised, leading to the leak of classified internal documents to the press. In the United States, the United States Census Bureau was accessed without authorization and personal information for around 4,200 employees leaked in protest against negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Other attacks by hacktivists such as Anonymous continued on government and government-related websites around the world.

Vulnerabilities and their Handling

During this period, fixes were released for the Edge^{*2*3} browser new to Microsoft's Windows 10, which was released in July. There were also fixes for Windows^{*4*5*6*7*8*9*10}, Internet Explorer^{*11*12*13}, and Office^{*14*15*16}. Updates were also made to Adobe Systems' Flash Player, Shockwave Player, Acrobat, and Reader. A quarterly update was released for Oracle's Java SE, fixing many vulnerabilities. A large number of vulnerabilities were also fixed in Apple's OS X. Several of these vulnerabilities were exploited in the wild before patches were released.

Regarding server applications, a quarterly update was released for a number of Oracle products, including the Oracle database server, fixing many vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in BIND DNS servers that could allow DoS attacks by external parties via the receipt of specially-crafted queries were also discovered and fixed. A number of vulnerabilities in the Apache Struts 2 Web

- *2 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-091 Critical: Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (3084525)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ ms15-091).
- *3 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-095 Critical: Cumulative Security Update for Microsoft Edge (3089665)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ ms15-095).
- *4 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-066 Critical: Vulnerability in VBScript Scripting Engine Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3072604)" (https://technet. microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-066).
- *5 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-067 Critical: Vulnerability in RDP Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3073094)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ security/ms15-067).
- *6 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-068 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Windows Hyper-V Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3072000)" (https://technet.microsoft. com/library/security/ms15-068).
- *7 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-077 Important: Vulnerability in ATM Font Driver Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3077657)" (https://technet.microsoft. com/library/security/ms15-077).
- *8 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-080 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Graphics Component Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3078662)" (https:// technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-080).
- *9 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-097 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Graphics Component Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3089656)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-097).
- *10 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-098 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Windows Journal Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3089669)" (https://technet.microsoft. com/library/security/ms15-098).
- *11 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-065 Critical: Security Update for Internet Explorer (3076321)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-065).
- *12 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-079 Critical: Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (3082442)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ ms15-079).
- *13 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-094 Critical: Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (3089548)" (https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ ms15-094).
- *14 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-070 Important: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3072620)" (https://technet. microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-070).
- *15 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-081 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3048019)" (https://technet.microsoft. com/library/security/ms15-081).
- *16 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-099 Critical: Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3089664)" (https://technet.microsoft. com/library/security/ms15-099).

July Incidents

	_										
1	0	1st: A leap second wa National Institute of In (http://jjy.nict.go.jp/ne	nformation Co	ommunications	Technol	ogy (NICT), "July	-		onger"		
2	0	2nd: The Financial Ser policies aimed at bols "Publication of the Po	tering cyber s	security in the f	ield of fi	inance.					
4	R										
		to P2P networks. Beca	ause the inter	nal information	leaked	included details of	n was compromised by an unknown party, and 400 GB of internal data leaked details of vulnerabilities in software such as Flash Player for which no fix was a number of attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities.				
5 6		See the following Had July 6, 2015" (http://w	king Team anr	nouncement fo	r more i	nformation about					cking Team on
7	0	7th: Due to issues wit									
8		advising users to take Ministry of Internal At	elephone charges, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications asked for the cooperation of telecommunications carrier organizations in advising users to take measures to prevent such damages caused by unauthorized use and stop their spread. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, "Regarding measures to prevent the unauthorized use of IP phones, etc., by third parties request)" (http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01ryutsu03_02000096.html) (in Japanese).								
9		8th: A vulnerability in was discovered and fi		ould allow DoS	attacks	from outside und	ler certain co	nditions, su	uch as when DNS	SSEC verificati	on is enabled,
10		Internet Systems Con (https://kb.isc.org/artic	sortium, "CVE		ecially (Constructed Zone	Data Can Cau	ise a Resolv	ver to Crash whe	n Validating″	
11		9th: A number of vuln specially-crafted web					uthorized terr	nination or	r arbitrary code e	execution whe	na
12		"APSB15-16: Security	updates avail	able for Adobe	Flash P	layer" (https://helj	ox.adobe.com	n/security/p	oroducts/flash-pla	ayer/apsb15-16	i.html).
13		11th: A vulnerability (specially-crafted webs "APSA15-04 Security	site is viewed	was disclosed.	A fix fo	r this vulnerability	(APSB15-18) was relea	sed on July 15.		when a
14	S	11th: The U.S. Office of									
15		contractors had leake	in June, revealing that information on 21.5 million current, former, and future federal employees and independent d. They also announced they would establish a dedicated suite of services and a call center to deal with this issue. ps to Protect Federal Workers and Others From Cyber Threats"								
16		(https://www.opm.gov						orkers-and	-others-from-cyb	er-threats/).	
17		15th: Microsoft publis MS15-065, MS15-066, "Microsoft Security B	and MS15-06	67, as well as 10	importa	ant updates.				ng four critical	updates such as
18		15th: A number of vul discovered and fixed. "APSB15-15: Security									
19		15th: A number of vul	nerabilities in	Adobe Shockv	vave Pla	ever that could all	ow an attacke	er to take o	ver control or ex	ecute arbitrary	code were
20		discovered and fixed. "Security update avai	lable for Adob	be Shockwave F	Player" ((https://helpx.adol	be.com/securi	ity/products	s/shockwave/aps	b15-17.html).	
21		15th: A number of vul "APSB15-18: Security					•				.html).
22		15th: Oracle released in Java SE.						-	-		es, including 25
23		"Oracle Critical Patch 21st: Microsoft releas									
24		"Microsoft Security B (https://technet.micros	ulletin MS15-0	078 - Critical: Vu	Inerabi	lity in Microsoft F			-		04)"
25	V	27th: A vulnerability in Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) Uconnect that could allow a vehicle to be controlled remotely was discovered and fixed. This vulnerability only applied to products sold in the U.S., and the manufacturer issued a recall for that region.									
26	1	US-CERT, "Vulnerability off (https://www.kb.cert.c	ty Note VU#81	19439 Fiat Chry					-	lled"	
27	V	28th: It was disclosed execute code. US-CERT, "Vulnerabili									
29	S	29th: There was a larg See the following Mai (https://blog.malware	warebytes Co	prporation blog	post for	r more details. "La	arge Malvertis	sing Campa	aign Takes on Yah		ler Exploit Kit.
30	S	31st: It was disclosed		-	the ema	ail address for inqu	uiries to the N	IPO suppor	rt desk on the Ca	binet Office N	PO site, leading
31		to emails being sent of "[Important Notice] Re			e NPO s	upport desk accou	nt" (https://ww	/w.npo-hom	nepage.go.jp/uplo	ads/20150731.p	df) (in Japanese).
			_		_					*Dates are in	I Japan Standard Time
Legend	V	Vulnerabilities	S Securi	ity Incidents	Ρ	Political and Soci	al Situation	H	History	0	Other



application framework that could allow arbitrary code execution or XSS when certain conditions were fulfilled were discovered and fixed^{*17}. A number of vulnerabilities that could allow sites to be compromised, including XSS vulnerabilities, were discovered and fixed in multiple versions of the WordPress CMS.

In July, a vulnerability^{*18} was disclosed in the Uconnect in-car system for Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) vehicles that could allow remote control takeover of a vehicle, enabling third parties to perform actions such as braking and steering. Several Android device vulnerabilities that could allow arbitrary file access or code execution on devices by a remote attacker were discovered and fixed. Only an outline was published for these vulnerabilities at first, but the discoverers presented more details of each at Black Hat USA 2015, the world's largest security conference held in Las Vegas in August.

Information Leaks Due to Unauthorized Access

Incidents of unauthorized access and resulting information leaks continue to occur. In July, the U.S. medical institution UCLA Health announced that a computer network containing personal details such as names and medical histories had been compromised, and the personal information of around 4.5 million people may have leaked^{*19}. In September, a U.S. medical insurance company was accessed without authorization, leading to the potential leak of 10.5 million pieces of personal data, including names and social security numbers. In an incident of unauthorized access that occurred at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in June, causing the leak of data on about 4 million federal employees, a subsequent investigation revealed that details of 21.5 million federal employees and independent contractors had actually leaked, and it is possible that fingerprint data of up to 5.6 million individuals had leaked as well^{*20}.

In Japan, the website of an education-related company was compromised in July, leading to the potential leak of personal information for up to 22,108 people. Also in July, the website of a travel-related company was accessed without authorization, and approximately 8,400 sets of email addresses and passwords for registered members may have leaked. Other incidents included a leak from the website of a toy company involving about 100,000 pieces of personal information registered to their online store. There were also many incidents of website compromise and resulting leaks of personal information due to the exploitation of application vulnerabilities, including SQL injections, affecting companies of all sizes in a range of fields, such as food and gift companies.

In addition to information leaks such as these caused by unauthorized access, since June websites for companies and organizations in Japan have also been compromised and altered to redirect users to malware, or exploited as C&C servers in targeted attacks. Due to this, IPA and JPCERT/CC have issued alerts with specific instructions regarding precautions to be observed for site operation, such as points that website administrators should check, and the frequency of inspection^{*21}.

Malware Infections and Information Leaks Due to Targeted Attacks

During the current survey period, there were frequent incidents such as malware infections on PCs within organizations, as well as resulting information leaks. In July, it was revealed that 36,300 pieces of data, including the personal information of students, may have leaked due to a PC used for work at a university being infected by malware attached to an email. In August, a malware infection caused by targeted emails from attackers posing as customers occurred at a railroad company, and it was disclosed that a number of business use PCs at the company had been infected with malware. Also in August, verification reports from a number of organizations were published regarding the leak of personal information from the Japan Pension Service in June. These summarized each of their perspectives on verification of the incident response as well as information security measures that should be bolstered to prevent future reoccurrence.

^{*17} The Apache Software Foundation, "Apache Struts 2 Documentation S2-025 Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability in Debug Mode and in exposed JSP files" (https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-025.html).

^{*18} See the following white paper from the person who disclosed the vulnerability for more information. "Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle" (http://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf).

^{*19} UCLA Health, "UCLA Health Victim of a Criminal Cyber Attack" (https://www.uclahealth.org/news/ucla-health-victim-of-a-criminal-cyber-attack).

^{*20 &}quot;Statement by OPM Press Secretary Sam Schumach on Background Investigations Incident" (https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/09/cyberstatement-923/).

^{*21} IPA, JPCERT/CC, "Alert 'Perform regular inspections to prepare for cyber attacks on websites'" (http://www.jpcert.or.jp/pr/2015/pr150003.html) (in Japanese).

August Incidents

Legend	V	Vulnerabilities	S Security Incidents	Political and Social Situation	لنا	History	0	Other
					m		_	Japan Standard Time
31				-operation-vivarium-targets-users-of-l				Japan Chards 17
30	S	attacks using Lizard S	Stresser.	announced they had arrested or were		-	spected of car	rying out DDoS
29				,			/	
28	S			oS attack that interfered with their ser GitHub status page (https://status.git)		ssages/2015-08-	25).	
27		(http://www.mhlw.go	.jp/kinkyu/dl/houdouhappyou	ı_150821-02.pdf) (in Japanese).				
26		(http://www.nenkin.go committee report on	o.jp/files/e7wRRjRfiKiN1.pdf) information leaks caused by	(in Japanese). Ministry of Health, Labo unauthorized access at the Japan Pens	ur and Welfa	are (published A		rification
25		determine the cause	of personal information leaks	al center of Incident readiness and Str at the Japan Pension Service" (http:// findings regarding the information lea	www.nisc.go	.jp/active/kihon	/pdf/incident_r	-
24	0	information from the	Japan Pension Service in Ju		-		-	
23			,>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>					
22		"Microsoft Security B	ebsite in Internet Explorer. Bulletin MS15-093 - Critical: S soft.com/library/security/ms1	ecurity Update for Internet Explorer (3(5-065).	88903)″			
21	V		-	of a vulnerability (CVE-2015-2502) tha	t could allow	v arbitrary code	execution via	the viewing of
20			Multiple I-O DATA LAN rout	ers vulnerable in UPnP functionality" (nttp://jvn.jp/e	n/jp/JVN17964s	918/).	
19				en when it was discovered that old wi cks. As support has finished for one of				-
18								
17		These vulnerabilities	-	mber of vulnerabilities in OS X withou on October 1 with "About the security	-	-		
16		1746. A. 10-11						
15				for a number of vulnerabilities in OS and Security Update 2015-006" (h		t.apple.com/en-	us/HT205031).	
14								
13	S	ROMMON images.		an attack that accesses IOS devices w Platforms" (http://tools.cisco.com/secu				alicious
12		"APSB15-19: Security	updates available for Adobe	Flash Player" (https://helpx.adobe.con	n/security/pro	oducts/flash-pla	yer/apsb15-19	
11		"Microsoft Security B	Bulletin Summary for August	2015" (https://technet.microsoft.com/lil			nd fived	
9	V			ummary for August 2015, and released s well as 10 important updates.	a total of 14	4 updates, inclu	ding four critic	cal updates for
8		(http://blog.checkpoin	nt.com/2015/08/06/certifigate/)					
7 °		Android devices, pote See the following Che	entially allowing access to us eck Point blog post for more	er data through the use of malicious a details. "Certifi-gate: Hundreds of Milli	pplications.			a minany
6		7th: A vulnerability (C	ertifi-gate) was disclosed in	the authentication function of the mo	vile Remote	Support Tools (nBST) installo	d in many
5	1	registered to their we "Reset ICANN.org We		s://www.icann.org/news/announcemen	t-2015-08-05-	-en).		
4	S	6th: ICANN announce	ed they had reset passwords	due to the potential leak of the names	, email addre	esses, and encr	ypted passwor	rds of users
3				attack of Japan (J-CRAT) activity report				
2	O		•	Cyber Rescue and Advice Team against from escalating by supporting the miti	-	-		
1		WordPress CMS appl	ication.	ites to be compromised, including XS se" (https://wordpress.org/news/2015/				



Attacks Based on Political and Social Situation and Historical Context

During this period each year there are incidents related to historical dates in the Pacific War, as well as Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands. We stayed vigilant, as this year it was expected that the websites of a number of government agencies and private-sector businesses in Japan would once again be subject to defacement through compromise via SQL injection or unauthorized access, or targeted in DDoS attacks, in relation to these sensitive issues. A few more DDoS attacks than usual were observed, but no large-scale attacks were confirmed, and the scale and number of attacks decreased compared to the same period in previous years.

Government Agency Initiatives

Government agency initiatives with regard to security measures included the cabinet's approval of a new Cyber Security Strategy that determines the basic direction for cyber security policy. This strategy indicates the basic course of direction for policy in the next three years, taking into consideration the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In light of the information leak that occurred at the Japan Pension Service in June, cyber security has been reinforced at all government agencies. For this reason, the strategy placed new emphasis on bolstering overall measures, including enhancements to the functions of the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), and moves to monitor independent administrative corporations and special government-affiliated corporations that carry out public work alongside government ministries. After approval of the Cyber Security Strategy, the first annual plan based on it, Cyber Security 2015, was determined by the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters^{*22}.

Verification reports regarding the leak of personal information that took place at the Japan Pension Service in June were published by NISC and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in August. As a result, the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters issued a recommendation to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare that monitoring of the Japan Pension Service be strengthened, and the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments at the ministry be clarified, based on Article 27 Item 3 of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity. It was also recommended that emergency procedures be put in place for when incidents occur.

In September, amendments to the "Act on the Use of Numbers to Identify a Specific Individual in the Administrative Procedure (My Number Act)" and "Act on the Protection of Personal Information" both passed the Lower House. The My Number Act was revised to expand the scope of use for the My Number system in areas such as finance and medicine. The My Number Act was enacted in October, and the Specific Personal Information Protection Commission published guidelines covering areas such as the response to leaks of specific personal information in anticipation of full scale operation, such as the issue of personal number cards that is set to start from January 2016*²³. The Act on the Protection of Personal Information clarified the definition of personal information, and laid out laws regarding the handling of anonymous information processed to prevent personal information from being restored. It also established a new Personal Information Protection Committee with the authority to monitor and supervise the handling of personal information as a third party organization*²³.

In September, the "Workshop on the Appropriate Way to Handle Cyber Attacks in the Telecommunications Business" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications also produced its second report. In this report, the issuing of alerts to users of malware-infected devices and the blocking of communications with C&C servers, etc., were arranged. Consequently, the amendment of guidelines^{*24} to apply the workshop's findings to the practical operations of telecommunications carriers was discussed at meetings such as the Council for the Stable Operation of the Internet.

Other

In July, the Italian security firm Hacking Team was attacked, resulting in the leak of a massive 400 GB of internal documents. The official Twitter account of the company was also taken over, and used to disseminate the stolen documents. This firm had been selling monitoring tools for devices such as PCs and smartphones to government and law enforcement agencies in a number of

^{*22} National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), "5th assembly of the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters (held on a rotating basis) (September 25, 2015)" (http://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/index.html#cs05) (in Japanese).

^{*23} See the following Specific Personal Information Protection Commission website for more information on the laws and guidelines regarding the My Number system (http://www.ppc.go.jp/en/).

^{*24 &}quot;Guidelines for Dealing with High Volume Communications and Privacy at Telecommunications Carriers (Third Edition)" (http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_ content/000362139.pdf) (in Japanese).

September Incidents

1	-		1st: The National Crin inaccessible. This is th			-	-	-	-		orarily rendering	ı their site
2	-											
3	-		3rd: A number of vuln Internet Systems Con	sortium, "	CVE-2015-5986: Ar	-	-					
4			(https://kb.isc.org/artic	IE/AA-UIZ	91).							
5			4th: A cabinet decisio		da wa mandin n 4h a Q	uhan Caa		-levilles -				alle and
6		0	externally, and indicat National center of Inc (http://www.nisc.go.jp	tes the ba ident read	sic direction for the iness and Strategy	e next thr for Cybe	ee years leading up ersecurity (NISC), "Re	to the Tok egarding (yo 2020 Ol	lympic and Par		-
7	\backslash											
8			5th:The official websi drive hunting of dolpl		-	-	-	-		arried out by An	nonymous in pro	test against the
9	_											
10		V	9th: A number of vuln "APSB15-22: Security					-				5-22.html).
11 12		V	9th: Microsoft publish such as MS15-094, M "Microsoft Security B	S15-095, a	nd MS15-099, as v	vell as sev	ven important updat	es.		-	-	itical updates
12	- 1		9th: The Ministry of In Attacks in the Telecon			-		-				-
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countries. The stolen information was also made available over BitTorrent, and because it contained customer lists and email content from the company, it came to light that many nations and intelligence agencies around the world were customers, including those in Asia, Europe, North America, South America, and Africa. A number of vulnerabilities in Adobe Systems' Flash Player and Microsoft's Windows^{*25} that had no fix available were also found via the leaked internal documents, so measures were taken to fix these vulnerabilities.

The email address for responding to support queries on a site related to the Cabinet Office was hijacked by an unknown party, leading to 20,000 spam messages being sent externally without authorization. In this incident, it has been identified that a contractor may have been using a short password that was easy to guess.

In September, Mandiant and FireEye announced they had discovered Cisco brand router products with altered firmware installed^{*26}. It is thought this was not due to vulnerabilities, but instead caused by malware installed on routers left with default authentication settings, or devices that had been managed improperly. Cisco issued an alert regarding these attacks in August, but investigations later published by research groups at academic organizations such as the University of Michigan indicated that infections were spreading, with 79 cases discovered in 19 countries^{*27}.

Also in September, there was an incident in which an EV-SSL certificate for a Google domain was issued without authorization, but it is thought this certificate was mistakenly issued for internal testing. Google has registered revocation information for this certificate and revoked it^{*28}.

1.3 Incident Survey


1.3.1 DDoS Attacks

Today, DDoS attacks on corporate servers are almost a daily occurrence, and the methods involved vary widely. However, most of these attacks are not the type that utilizes advanced knowledge such as that of vulnerabilities, but rather cause large volumes of unnecessary traffic to overwhelm network bandwidth or server processes for the purpose of hindering services.

Direct Observations

Figure 2 shows the circumstances of DDoS attacks handled by the IIJ DDoS Protection Service between July 1 and September 30, 2015.

This information shows traffic anomalies judged to be attacks based on IIJ DDoS Protection Service standards. IIJ also responds to other DDoS attacks, but these incidents are excluded from the figure due to the difficulty in accurately ascertaining the facts of each situation.



*25 "Microsoft Security Bulletin MS15-078 - Critical: Vulnerability in Microsoft Font Driver Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3079904)" (https://technet. microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms15-078.aspx).

*26 See the following FireEye blog posts for more information about this attack. "SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part I" (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/ threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html), "SYNful Knock - A Cisco router implant - Part II" (https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/ synful_knock_-_acis0.html).

*27 ZMap, "In Search of SYNful Routers" (https://zmap.io/synful/).

*28 Google Online Security Blog, "Improved Digital Certificate Security" (https://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.jp/2015/09/improved-digital-certificate-security.html).

There are many methods that can be used to carry out a DDoS attack, and the capacity of the environment attacked (bandwidth and server performance) will largely determine the degree of impact. Figure 2 categorizes DDoS attacks into three types: attacks on bandwidth capacity^{*29}, attacks on servers^{*30}, and compound attacks (several types of attacks on a single target conducted at the same time).

During the three months under study, IIJ dealt with 400 DDoS attacks. This averages to 4.35 attacks per day, indicating an increase in the average daily number of attacks compared to our prior report. Server attacks accounted for 59.3% of all incidents, while compound attacks accounted for 34.9%, and bandwidth capacity attacks 5.8%. The largest attack observed during the period under study was classified as a compound attack, and resulted in 4.5 Gbps of bandwidth using up to 289,000 pps packets.

Of all attacks, 81.5% ended within 30 minutes of commencement, 17.8% lasted between 30 minutes and 24 hours, and 0.7% lasted over 24 hours. The longest sustained attack for this period was a compound attack that lasted for two days, 22 hours, and 35 minutes (70 hours and 35 minutes).





Figure 3: DDoS Attack Targets by Country According to Backscatter Observations

(No. of Packets)

In most cases, we observed an extremely large number of IP addresses, whether domestic or foreign. We believe this is accounted for by the use of IP spoofing^{*31} and botnet^{*32} usage as the method for conducting DDoS attacks.

Backscatter Observations

Next we present our observations of DDoS attack backscatter using the honeypots^{*33} set up by the MITF, a malware activity observation project operated by IIJ^{*34}. By monitoring backscatter it is possible to detect some of the DDoS attacks occurring on external networks as a third party without any interposition.





*29 Attack that overwhelms the network bandwidth capacity of a target by sending massive volumes of larger-than-necessary IP packets and fragments. The use of UDP packets is called a UDP flood, while the use of ICMP packets is called an ICMP flood.

*30 TCP SYN flood, TCP connection flood, and HTTP GET flood attacks. TCP SYN flood attacks send mass volumes of SYN packets that signal the start of TCP connections, forcing the target to prepare for major incoming connections, causing the wastage of processing capacity and memory. TCP connection flood attacks establish mass volumes of actual TCP connections. HTTP GET flood attacks establish TCP connections on a Web server, and then send mass volumes of HTTP GET protocol commands, wasting processing capacity and memory.

*31 Misrepresentation of a sender's IP address. Creates and sends an attack packet that has been given an address other than the actual IP address of the attacker to make it appear as if the attack is coming from a different location, or from a large number of individuals.

*32 A "bot" is a type of malware that institutes an attack after receiving a command from an external C&C server. A network constructed of a large number of bots acting in concert is called a botnet.

*33 Honeypots established by the MITF, a malware activity observation project operated by IIJ. See also "1.3.2 Malware Activities."

*34 The mechanism and limitations of this observation method, as well as some of the results of IIJ's observations, are presented in Vol.8 of this report (http://www. iij.ad.jp/en/company/development/iir/pdf/iir_vol08_EN.pdf) under "1.4.2 Observations on Backscatter Caused by DDoS Attacks."



For the backscatter observed between July 1 and September 30, 2015, Figure 3 shows the sender's IP addresses classified by country, and Figure 4 shows trends in packet numbers by port.

The port most commonly targeted by the DDoS attacks observed was the 53/UDP port used for DNS, accounting for 53.2% of the total. This was followed by 80/TCP used for Web services at 20.6%, so the top two ports accounted for 73.8% of the total. Attacks were also observed on 443/TCP used for HTTPS, 22/TCP used for SSH, and 25565/TCP and 27015/UDP that are sometimes used for game servers, as well as 3306/UDP and 51127/TCP, which are not commonly used.

Examining the daily average number of packets for the 53/UDP communications observed often since February 2014, we can see that although it remained mostly unchanged at around 5,800 compared to around 5,600 in the previous survey period, it remains high.

Looking at the origin of backscatter thought to indicate IP addresses targeted by DDoS by country in Figure 3, China accounted for the largest ratio at 21.7%. The United States and France followed at 18.5% and 6.4%, respectively.

Regarding particularly large numbers of backscatter packets observed by port, there were attacks on the Web servers (80/TCP and 443/TCP) of a U.S. hosting provider on July 1, and attacks on a number of servers of a hosting provider in Canada between July 13 and July 17. On August 7 there were attacks on game-related sites in France and Germany, and between September 4 and September 10 attacks targeting a number of servers of a U.S. CDN provider were observed. Attacks on other ports included those targeting 22/TCP, 8080/TCP, and 22/UDP on a server of a hosting provider in Canada between August 21 and August 27. We also observed attacks targeting 25565/TCP on a game server in France between September 5 and September 11. On September 4, a large number of attacks were also observed targeting a range of ports on a specific server in Latvia.

Notable DDoS attacks during the current survey period that were detected via IIJ's observations of backscatter included attacks on the servers of an instant messaging service provider based in Germany between July 10 and July 12, and attacks on the site for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on July 18. Attacks were also observed targeting a site related to a right-wing organization in Ukraine on August 18, and targeting GitHub on August 25.




Figure 5: Sender Distribution (by Country, Entire Period under Study)




Figure 6: Communications Arriving at Honeypots (by Date, by Target Port, per Honeypot)

1.3.2 Malware Activities

(No. of Unique Specimens)

Here, we will discuss the results of the observations of the MITF^{*35}, a malware activity observation project operated by IIJ. The MITF uses honeypots^{*36} connected to the Internet in a manner similar to general users in order to observe communications arriving over the Internet. Most appear to be communications by malware selecting a target at random, or scans attempting to locate a target for attack.

Status of Random Communications

Figure 5 shows the distribution of sender's IP addresses by country for communications coming into the honeypots between July 1 and September 30, 2015. Figure 6 shows trends in the total volumes (incoming packets). The MITF has set up numerous






Figure 7: Distribution of Acquired Specimens by Source (by Country, Entire Period under Study, Excluding Conficker) honeypots for the purpose of observation. We have taken the average per honeypot, showing the trends for incoming packet types (top ten) over the entire period subject to study. Additionally, in these observations we corrected data to count multiple TCP connections as a single attack when the attack involved multiple connections to a specific port, such as attacks on MSRPC.

Much of the communications arriving at the honeypots during the current survey period targeted 1900/UDP used for the UPnP SSDP protocol, 23/TCP used for TELNET, 22/TCP used for SSH, 445/TCP used by Microsoft OSes, 1433/TCP used by Microsoft's SQL Server, or 80/TCP and 443/TCP used by Web servers.







*35 An abbreviation of Malware Investigation Task Force. The Malware Investigation Task Force (MITF) began activities in May 2007, observing malware network activity through the use of honeypots in an attempt to understand the state of malware activities, to gather technical information for countermeasures, and to link these findings to actual countermeasures.

*36 A system designed to simulate damages from attacks by emulating vulnerabilities, recording the behavior of attackers, and the activities of malware.



The 1900/UDP SSDP protocol spikes up in numbers intermittently. For example, we received SSDP search requests from IP addresses allocated to the United States between July 16 and July 17, from the Netherlands on July 23, and from addresses allocated to countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada between mid-September and late September. These communications are thought to have been searching for devices that could be used in DDoS attacks using SSDP reflectors.

Malware Network Activity

Figure 7 shows the distribution of the specimen acquisition source for malware during the period under study, while Figure 8 shows trends in the total number of malware specimens acquired. Figure 9 shows trends in the number of unique specimens. In Figure 8 and Figure 9, the number of acquired specimens show the total number of specimens acquired per day^{*37}, while the number of unique specimens is the number of specimen variants categorized according to their digest of a hash function^{*38}. Specimens are also identified using anti-virus software, and a breakdown of the top 10 variants is displayed color coded by malware name. As with our previous reports, for Figure 8 and Figure 9 we have detected Conficker using multiple anti-virus software packages, and removed any Conficker results when totaling data.

On average, 89 specimens were acquired per day during the period under study, representing 19 different malware. After investigating the undetected specimens more closely, they included worms observed from IP addresses allocated to countries such as China, Taiwan, Austria, the United States, and Thailand. A bot that uses IRC as a C&C server^{*39} was also observed in Taiwan^{*40}.

About 53% of undetected specimens were in text format. Because many of these text format specimens were HTML 404 or 403 error responses from Web servers, we believe this was due to infection behavior of malware such as old worms continuing despite the closure of download sites that newly-infected PCs access to download malware.

Under the MITF's independent analysis, during the current period under observation 84.6% of malware specimens acquired were worms, 6.4% were bots, and 9.0% were downloaders. In addition, the MITF confirmed the presence of 102 botnet C&C servers and 7 malware distribution sites. The number of botnet C&C servers is higher than before, but this was due to the appearance of a specimen that used a DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) during the current survey period.

Conficker Activity

Including Conficker, an average of 27,935 specimens were acquired per day during the period covered by this report, representing 543 different malware. Although the number of infections from the United States increased in July, they subsequently dropped, continually rising and falling over short periods. Conficker accounted for 99.5% of the total specimens acquired, and 98.8% of unique specimens. This demonstrates that Conficker remains the most prevalent malware by far, so we have omitted it from figures in this report. Compared to the previous survey period, the total number of specimens acquired increased by approximately 44% during the period covered by this report, and the number of unique specimens decreased by about 10%. The increase in the total number of specimens acquired was due to a spike in infection activity from IP addresses allocated to the United States during the current survey period. According to the observations of the Conficker Working Group^{*41}, as of October 1, 2015, a total of 675,680 unique IP addresses are infected. This indicates a drop to about 21% of the 3.2 million PCs observed in November 2011, but it demonstrates that infections are still widespread.

^{*37} This indicates the malware acquired by honeypots.

^{*38} This figure is derived by utilizing a one-way function (hash function) that outputs a fixed-length value for various input. The hash function is designed to produce as many different outputs as possible for different inputs. While we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of specimens by hash value, given that obfuscation and padding may result in specimens of the same malware having different hash values, the MITF has expended its best efforts to take this fact into consideration when using this methodology as a measurement index.

^{*39} An abbreviation of Command & Control Server. A server that provides commands to a botnet consisting of a large number of bots.

^{*40} WORM_SDBOT.FJK (http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/archive/malware/worm_sdbot.fjk).


^{*41} Conficker Working Group Observations (http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/ANY/InfectionTracking).

1.3.3 SQL Injection Attacks

Of the types of different Web server attacks, IIJ conducts ongoing surveys related to SQL injection attacks^{*42}. SQL injection attacks have flared up in frequency numerous times in the past, remaining one of the major topics in the Internet security. SQL injections are known to occur in one of three attack patterns: those that attempt to steal data, those that attempt to overload database servers, and those that attempt to rewrite Web content.

Figure 10 shows the distribution of SQL injection attacks against Web servers detected between July 1 and September 30, 2015. Figure 11 shows trends in the numbers of attacks. These are a summary of attacks detected by signatures on the IIJ Managed IPS Service. Japan was the source for 28.2% of attacks observed, while the United States and China accounted for 28.1% and 20.3%, respectively, with other countries following in order. There was a dramatic increase in the number of SQL injection attacks against Web servers compared to the previous report. This is due to a rise in attacks from countries such as Japan and the United States.

During this period, attacks from multiple attack sources in China and Germany directed at specific targets took place on July 18. There were also attacks from sources in a comparatively wide range of countries, including the U.K., Germany, Turkey, and the United States, targeting other specific targets. On July 24, there were attacks from a specific attack source directed at a number of specific targets. Other attacks were also made from specific attack sources in the United States and the Netherlands directed at specific targets. On August 1, there were attacks from specific attack sources in China directed at specific targets from specific attack sources in the United States. On September 17, there were attacks from specific attack sources in China directed at specific targets attacks from specific targets. These attacks are thought to have been attempts to find vulnerabilities on a Web server.



As previously shown, attacks of various types were properly detected and dealt with in the course of service. However, attack attempts continue, requiring ongoing attention.

1.3.4 Website Alterations

Here we indicate the status of website alterations as surveyed through the MITF Web crawler (client honeypot)*43.




Figure 10: Distribution of SQL Injection Attacks by Source

*42 Attacks accessing a Web server to send SQL commands, thereby manipulating an underlying database. Attackers access or alter the database content without proper authorization, and steal sensitive information or rewrite Web content.

*43 See "1.4.3 Website Defacement Surveys Using Web Crawlers" in Vol.22 of this report (http://www.iij.ad.jp/en/company/development/iir/pdf/iir_vol22_EN.pdf) for an explanation of Web crawler observation methods.




This Web crawler accesses hundreds of thousands of websites on a daily basis, with a focus on well-known and popular sites in Japan. We also add new target sites on a regular basis. In addition to this, we temporarily monitor websites that have seen short- term increases in access numbers. By surveying websites thought to be viewed frequently by typical users in Japan, it is easier to speculate on trends regarding fluctuations in the number of altered sites, as well as the vulnerabilities exploited and malware distributed.

During the period of July to September, 2015, Angler spread like wildfire (Figure 12)*⁴⁴. The total number of drive-by download attacks was almost 10 times the total number for April to June, 2015. Throughout this period, Angler accounted for the majority of attacks. However, in late August, some attackers that had up until then used Angler began using Neutrino. Since then, depending on the timing, attacks based on either the Angler or Neutrino Exploit Kit have been observed from the same altered website. Because the ratio of both varies each day, it appears as if the attackers are comparing multiple attack tools.

TeslaCrypt 2.0 made up the majority of the malware downloaded until early September, but after that it was replaced by CryptoWall 3.0, and TeslaCrypt 2.0 was no longer detected. In some cases observed, Bedep or Necurs were also downloaded in Angler and Neutrino attacks.

The number of attacks detected dropped sharply between September 18 and September 25. During this period, there were a number of cases in which the links on altered websites leading to exploit kits or their redirectors were deleted, or the next step leading from the redirector to the infector was not carried out. The attackers' intentions are not known, but the number of attacks detected subsequently increased again.

An extremely high number of drive-by download attacks continue to occur. In addition to altered websites, there have been many cases in which users were redirected to infectors via advertisement content displayed on a website (malvertising)*⁴⁵. Website operators must take measures to prevent the alteration of Web content, and properly manage the mashup content provided by external third parties, such as advertisements and Web analytics services. We recommend that they stay aware of the security policies and reputations of content providers. It is also important for browser users and administrators to check for vulnerabilities in OSes and browser-related plug-ins, and carry out thorough countermeasures such as applying updates and enabling EMET.



*Covers several tens of thousands of sites in Japan. In recent years, drive-by downloads have been configured to change attack details and whether or not attacks are made based on the client system environment or session information, source address attributes, and the quota achievement status of factors such as number of attacks. This means that results can vary wildly at times depending on the test environment and circumstances.



*44 See "1.4.2 Angler Exploit Kit on the Rampage" in Vol.28 of this report (http://www.iij.ad.jp/en/company/development/iir/pdf/iir_vol28_EN.pdf) for more information about our observations of the status and functions of Angler in July 2015.

*45 See the Malwarebytes article "Large Malvertising Campaign Goes (Almost) Undetected" (https://blog.malwarebytes.org/malvertising-2/2015/09/largemalvertising-campaign-goes-almost-undetected/) for more information on malvertising during the same period.

1.4 Focused Research

Incidents occurring over the Internet change in type and scope from one minute to the next. Accordingly, IIJ works toward implementing countermeasures by continuing to perform independent surveys and analyses of prevalent incidents. Here we will present information from the survey we have undertaken during this period regarding route hijacking and the latest status of TLS 1.3.

1.4.1 Route Hijacking

In January 2015, we discovered that a certain IPv4 address block managed by IIJ was being advertised to the Internet by a third party without authorization. IIJ dealt with the issue immediately, and carried out an investigation into the cause. Here we will discuss the current state of unauthorized route advertisement, and share some of what we learned from this incident.

The Inner Workings of Route Control

IP addresses are used to identify communication devices and point to destinations when communicating over the Internet. Of course, communications would not go well if IP addresses were to overlap, so to ensure each is unique, Internet Registries (IR) with a hierarchical management structure handle the allocation of IP addresses on the Internet. In Japan, IP addresses are usually allocated by applying to APNIC, the Regional IR (RIR) for the Asia-Pacific region, or JPNIC, Japan's National IR (NIR).

While organizations such as APNIC and JPNIC are responsible for IP address allocation and the associated management of registry information, matters such as ensuring the reachability of an IP address are the role of the party to which the address is allocated. To ensure reachability on the Internet, it is necessary to notify other networks of the details of the IP address block used. Currently, a routing protocol called BGP is the standard method used for routing control between networks, so each network uses BGP to generate information on the IP address block it is using, and notify other networks. This is known as route advertisement. Other networks receiving this route advertisement then forward IP packets bound for that IP address block to the network that advertised that route. Each network actually has its own BGP routing policy, and when route advertisements with different routes from the same address are received, only the route selected by the router as the optimal one based on priority level is used for packet forwarding.

BGP route advertisement itself is actually an easy process that simply involves adding a few lines of commands to the router, and based on the specifications anyone can advertise any route. The routing information advertised is also used as valid until revoked by the network that carried out route advertisement. In other words, incorrectly advertised routing information is instantly broadcast to the entire world, and remains in effect until the settings are explicitly canceled. Consequently, when carrying out new route advertisement, it is crucial to avoid configuration and confirmation errors. However, with the spread of the Internet a range of networks around the world now exchange routes via BGP, so it is inevitably possible for errors to occur at some point. Additionally, when a router exchanging routes via BGP is hijacked by someone with malicious intent, improper route advertisement may be carried out willfully. It is important to check that the routers on each network are being operated appropriately, by applying access control, performing monitoring, and carrying out regular inspections of their settings.

Routing Security

There are a number of ways to reduce configuration errors and mitigate the impact of false route advertisement. First, when advertising routes, the validity of advertised routes for that IP address block is checked. IR such as APNIC and JPNIC publish registry information for the IP addresses they allocate via whois, so it is possible to refer to this to check that there are no discrepancies between the allocated organization and the IP address block. It is also effective to implement route filters at network interconnection points to prevent the propagation of false routing information. In particular, it is possible to limit the scope of impact that false routing information has by applying strict inbound route filters to transit networks that relay routing information. For this reason, organizations that provide transit services in many cases operate by having customers notify them of IP address block information scheduled to be advertised in advance, and updating the route filter based on this. Even so, cases of false route advertisement was corrected immediately after being advertised, so it is thought that most are the result of unintended configuration errors. For this reason, we believe the term "unauthorized route advertisement" is more appropriate when referring to the phenomenon as a whole.



These cases of unauthorized route advertisement can also affect reachability, so it is necessary to detect them when they occur. A variety of detection-related initiatives are being carried out around the world, and in Japan Telecom-ISAC Japan and JPNIC have formed a partnership to operate the "Keiro-Bugyo" route hijacking detection system. Keiro-Bugyo utilizes the route objects registered to the JPIRR Internet Routing Registry (IRR) operated by JPNIC as standards to determine correct routing, comparing this data with BGP routing information submitted to the system by ISPs in Japan to detect anomalous routes. Routes that are advertised from a source other than the one registered to the route object are treated as anomalous, so this system is useful for detecting anomalous routes due to configuration errors. Additionally, because routing information of this system since it was introduced, and we have been committed to activities that further improve detection rates. IJ also uses the system to monitor routes itself, and in the past we have taken action after receiving an alert from Keiro-Bugyo when routes advertised by IIJ were also advertised by other networks.

Classifying false route advertisements using a detection system is a difficult task. For example, erroneously registered route objects are also detected as anomalies by Keiro-Bugyo. As external parties cannot know the usage intended by the administrator of an IP address block, it is hard to confirm whether this configuration is legitimate or not, so they can only be classed as "suspected" route hijackings. It is also rare to receive a report on the cause from the party the false route advertisement originated from. In cases shared by Telecom-ISAC Japan, inquiries to networks where a route advertisement originated were also simply answered with "we fixed it," so there were many times when it was unclear whether incidents were caused by a configuration error on-site, or some other reason. The incidents we discuss here that IIJ responded to are valuable cases of "route hijacking" where our investigations into the cause clearly identified that the perpetrator had malicious intent.

Overview of Route Hijacking Incidents

On February 4, 2015, an email message was posted to a mailing list for the JApan Network Operators' Group (JANOG). It indicated that a /16 IPv4 address block managed by IIJ was advertised by another network, and included in the Spamhaus Block List. After seeing this, we took action immediately. As route advertising for the block in question was in fact being performed by an ISP in the United States, our first aim was to take back the route and stop it from the source it was being advertised from. Because routing information for a smaller address block is given a higher priority (more specific routes) when it comes to IP route control, we advertised more specific routing information as a temporary measure so that route advertisement from IIJ was given priority on other networks. At the same time, we looked up the contact information for the corresponding ISP in the United States, and got in touch with them. ISPs have a range of different points of contact, such as those for business inquiries, and support desks for each service, so unless you direct your inquiries appropriately it could take time to receive a response, or you may be ignored for contacting an unrelated department. For routing issues such as these, it is necessary to identify the network operations center (NOC) of the organization in question, so we searched using whois and the ISP's website, and got in touch with the point of contact that seemed most likely to apply.

After sending the details to the corresponding ISP by email, we also contacted them by phone straight away to confirm they had received the email and ask for a response. Because many ISPs in the U.S. have implemented a ticket system that manages the progress of tasks, we also asked for a ticket number to be issued. We were told that the ticket number would be sent by email, so we waited for a reply, but we had not received a response over 24 hours later. For that reason, we called them once again, and requested that a ticket be issued then and there. As a result we were finally assigned a ticket number that we could use to track progress. Because a different staff member took the call than the one we had spoken to before, we once again asked them to confirm the whois information on the spot, to have them acknowledge that our request was legitimate. According to the information from the ISP, they began advertising the IPv4 address block at issue at the request of a customer. They agreed to contact that customer and cease advertising the route within 24 hours, even if they got no reply. As a result, after making contact on the afternoon of February 4, 2015, the corresponding route advertisement ceased three days later, in the early hours of February 7, 2015. Because this IPv4 address block was included in the Spamhaus Block List, we requested that it be removed after the false route advertisement ended, and the following day it was deleted from the list.

Looking at the history of routing information in IIJ's possession, this false routing information began to be advertised on January 5, 2015, but IIJ did not notice until the details were posted to JANOG. This IP address block actually came to be managed by IIJ based on IPv4 address transfer procedures, and at the time we were retaining it for future use without advertising the routes. While the whois information registered to JPNIC was of course up to date, in part due to the routes not being advertised, they were not registered in the route database of JPIRR, etc., and were not subject to monitoring by the aforementioned Keiro-Bugyo system. Consequently, we were not aware when false route advertisement occurred. As a result of this incident, we reappraised all of the IP address blocks under our management, and began registering them to IRR such as JPIRR and carrying out route advertising. This means all IP address blocks that IIJ manages are currently monitored by Keiro-Bugyo.

To prevent the issue from reoccurring, we asked the U.S. ISP that had been the source of the false route advertising to provide us with information related to the origin of the route advertising. After tireless negotiations, we were sent a surprising document on February 27, 2015, about three weeks after they stopped route advertising. Figure 13 is a document known as a Letter of Authority (LoA), which is submitted when a customer requests that an ISP advertises an IP address block of their own.

Because a formal document from an organization is required, letterhead format is used, with the company's logo and contact details listed at the top of the document. This simply contains a statement authorizing the ISP to carry out route advertisement, the IP address block to be used, the contact details and signature of the responsible person, and the date. Looking at the details that were submitted in the document, it was presented as being from the organization that had managed the IPv4 address block before it was transferred. That said, the organization name and contact details were slightly different from those we were familiar with.

To confirm, we brought the document to the organization that had managed the corresponding IPv4 address block before the IPv4 addresses were transferred, and had them look over it. As it turns out, it was indeed a falsified document. They confirmed the company name listed did not exist, and that it was highly likely the logo and address of a related company had been used. It was also clarified that the phone number and responsible person were most likely reused from information previously registered to whois. They had no knowledge of the domain name for the email address specified under the contact details. The document was signed by the person formerly responsible, but they confirmed that this signature did not match that for the staff member in question. The perpetrator appeared to have registered a new domain name that resembled the company name to use, and the whois information for the domain name matched the company name and staff member name on the LoA document.

Here we will present a timeline for these events, including some estimates (Figure 14). The domain name used as a cover on the LoA was registered on October 7, 2014, so it seems likely that the target was chosen before this date. We speculate that at this time an IPv4 address block without existing route advertisements or a specific point of contact was chosen so they could make use of it for as long as possible. Then, on October 7, they registered the domain name to be used as a cover based on the whois




Figure 13: LoA Example

Figure 14: Timeline of the Incident



information of the target. After that, they would have had to organize a suitable server that could receive email. Subsequently, while the perpetrator was making preparations, something they did not foresee happened. Namely, the transfer of IPv4 addresses. From October 21, 2014, the IPv4 address block in question came under the management of IIJ. However, we believe it likely that the perpetrator was not aware of this. On December 9, 2014, they followed through with their preparations by submitting the LoA in PDF format to the U.S. ISP that eventually advertised the routes, under a name resembling the organization that managed the addresses prior to their transfer. As a result, the ISP advertised routes for the corresponding IPv4 address block from January 5, 2015, to February 7, 2015, when they were contacted by IIJ and ceased advertising.

Upon investigating details associated with this incident, we discovered that other suspicious incidents had occurred. On February 10, 2015, three days after advertisement of the IP address block ceased based on IIJ's request, the IP address block next in sequential IP address order began to be advertised by the same ISP. After investigating, we learned that this was done by the same perpetrator, using almost the same technique to have the route advertised. It seems that this incident was dealt with independently, and route advertisement ceased on May 16, 2015. The Internet was introduced to Japan at an early stage compared to other regions around the world, and in its early years there were organizations that were allocated comparatively large IP address blocks. Of these IP address blocks, those with incomplete whois information or inaccurate contact details, those being held in reserve, and those only used internally with routes not advertised over the Internet, are likely to be easy targets for false route advertising like the incident we are discussing here. For that reason, we recommend evaluation of the measures described below.

Let us consider what uses the perpetrator had in mind for the network. IIJ has actually not been able to ascertain the details of this incident. Thorough and exceedingly risky measures were employed, such as registering a fake domain name and producing fake documentation, so we think there was some kind of malicious intent. However, we have no evidence of what the network was used for, so we do not know what its purpose was. Our investigation into this incident is ongoing. Regarding other incidents, cases in which IP addresses were exploited to send spam have been reported. The SANOG community for the South Asian region has shared information about an incident in which the administrator of a certain network suddenly began receiving a torrent of spam complaints. After the administrator looked into the issue, they found that an IP address block had been subject to a temporary route hijacking, and apparently used to send large volumes of spam. Because route hijacking is sometimes discovered through complaint emails to administrators, it is important to maintain your point of contact and continue to deal with complaints.

Lessons Learned from the Incident, and Route Hijacking Measures

The false route advertising that took place in this incident could have been prevented if the ISP in question had screened the documentation properly. The JPNIC whois information had been changed to IIJ's contact details by the time the LoA arrived, meaning there were discrepancies in the documentation. On the other hand, whois searches require a certain amount of knowledge and technique. Because the IR that manage IP address registry information form a hierarchical structure, it is necessary to navigate your way back up as you search. Some whois clients can trace this automatically to a certain extent, but there are few regions with a NIR for each country, so most clients search and display results based on the RIR whois for each region, or in other words on the APNIC whois level in the Asia-Pacific region. The English portion of the information registered to JPNIC is also transferred to the APNIC whois and displayed there, but to decipher this correctly you need to know how each piece of information is being reflected. The management of blocks registered at the dawn of the Internet has been transferred to the regional RIR of registrants in the ERX project, and it recently became possible to transfer IPv4 addresses across regions, so this also makes it necessary to perform whois searches by tracing the path appropriately to gain the correct information.

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a standardized format for registry information that is a little easier to use on computers than whois. This involves using digital certificates to describe the assignment or allocation of Internet number resources such as IP addresses. It is possible to issue digital certificates called resource certificates based on IR registry information, and you can use these to verify the assignment and allocation of IP addresses. Because digital certificates are utilized, you can also add digital signatures to documents. For example, by attaching a digital signature to an LoA using a resource certificate, and validating it on the recipient side, it is possible to check that the document is from the genuine administrator of the IP address block. They can also be used for route control. Currently, Origin Validation technology that validates the AS number of the origin of a route has been standardized, and progress is being made with its implementation on routers. The operator must learn about general public key cryptography technology such as PKI, but if run correctly this should serve as a very robust authentication infrastructure. We

believe it will take some time for it to become widespread, but IIJ would like to contribute to the popularization of RPKI through validation and operation. Let us examine what measures can currently be taken when you are assigned or allocated IP addresses. Through this incident we have learned that the following two points are likely the keys to reducing the likelihood of being targeted and enabling ISPs to notice abnormalities when route advertising is requested.

- 1. Ensure that whois contact details are maintained
- 2. Advertise routes

Regarding whois information, we recommend that contact details be recorded as accurately as possible, including the organization name and address, phone number, and email address, so they can be used for identification when referred to. This whois information is also sometimes referenced to find contact details and lodge grievances, so it is necessary to be aware that these points of contact may end up processing complaints, and because it serves as a public window, they could end up receiving spam on a daily basis. Complaint emails sometimes have spam attached to them, but if you apply a simple learning or keyword match spam filter the complaints themselves may be detected as spam and not received, so caution must be exercised.

As for route advertisement, even when Internet reachability is not required, it is safer to advertise routes to indicate they are being operated properly. That said, when routes are advertised, IP packets destined for those IP address blocks will be taken in, meaning that IP packets used to probe for vulnerabilities or services that are operating will arrive. To avoid taking unnecessary risk and maintain the current environment to the extent possible, we recommend that you merely advertise routes, while discarding all packets destined for those IP address blocks. When already using some kind of Internet access service, that ISP may be able to take care of this if you ask them, and if necessary you would be welcome to discuss the issue with IIJ. When advertising routes, they will be subject to the Keiro-Bugyo monitoring service if the route objects are properly registered in the JPIRR routing information database. This increases the chances of detecting fraudulent route advertising at an early stage, so we recommend you look into doing this also.

It is likely that other route hijacking attempts such as the incident discussed here will continue to be made on the Internet. From our point of view, there are two main reasons for this. Firstly, because a range of organizations are investigating the sending of spam and hosting of malware, and building reputation databases on an IP address level, there is demand for new IP address blocks that can be exploited for any purpose. Secondly, the free pool of IPv4 addresses is running out around the world, gradually making it harder and harder to secure the required amount of IPv4 addresses through existing services. Due to these circumstances, we believe there is an ongoing risk of route hijacking taking place. Also, as mentioned before, the whois information for many IP address blocks in Japan that were allocated in the early days of the Internet has not been updated properly, making them ripe targets for hijacking. When an IP address block you manage is exploited via route hijacking, it may be added to block lists you aren't aware of, or given a low rating in a reputation database. This could affect communications in the future. You may also be caught having to handle complaints you have no knowledge of, so we recommend that suitable measures be taken.

Summary

Much like other security measures, it is important to approach route hijacking countermeasures from the perspective of increasing the cost to the attacker. We consider it crucial to prepare an environment that doesn't easily fall victim to route hijacking, and put in place a system for detecting and dealing with route hijacking swiftly when it does occur. To achieve this, it will be necessary to look into implementing a range of technological and operational initiatives. These include improving the reliability of IR registry information, and re-examining validation methods for IP addresses provided by customers through the utilization of RPKI. We also need to implement measures for preventing the distribution of false route information, such as the operation of strict route filters or route authentication via RPKI. Another key point is enhancing technology for detecting fraudulent routes through Keiro-Bugyo and other abnormal route detection mechanisms. Building cooperative and trusting relationships that enable the sharing of required information and coordinated responses between networks is another crucial factor. In addition to this, we would also like to build an environment that prevents the recurrence of route hijacking, while consulting with law enforcement agencies and other organizations. These initiatives will be carried out in cooperation with many others involved in Internet routing, and do not only concern IIJ, so we would like to share our knowledge with as many people as possible, and continue to perform tests, have discussions, and make improvements in the future.



1.4.2 The Latest Status of TLS 1.3

Due to the discovery of a string of different vulnerability types affecting the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) / TLS (Transport Layer Security) secure protocols implemented in a wide range of browsers, there have been calls for a fundamental solution. Consequently, all eyes are focused on TLS 1.3, the next version of the TLS protocol. In this report we will touch upon the issues and background of previous versions, and examine the current development of TLS 1.3.

The History of SSL/TLS

In 1995, SSL 2.0 was implemented in the Netscape Navigator browser of the day, in the same period as the Internet draft "drafthickman-netscape-ssl" was published by Netscape Communications. SSL 3.0, which fixed a number of problems and also included some extensions, was subsequently used until recently. However, after the POODLE attack disclosed in October last year exposed fundamental flaws in SSL 3.0, SSL was no longer considered secure to use. Currently, it is recommended that neither SSL 2.0 nor SSL 3.0 be used*⁴⁶. RFC for versions 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 of TLS, the successor to SSL that was drawn up by the IETF, were released in 1999, 2006, and 2008, respectively*⁴⁷. Details of the main changes in each version are discussed in the guidelines*⁴⁸ created by the CRYPTREC cryptographic technology evaluation project. To give an overview, an issue when using the CBC mode in TLS 1.0 that was widely exposed by attacks such as the BEAST attack was identified, and TLS 1.1 resolved this problem. In TLS 1.2 it became possible to use comparatively new cryptographic algorithms, such as GCM and CCM that are classified as authenticated encryption modes, and the SHA-2 families.

Table 1 summarizes the workarounds in each version^{*49}. TLS 1.0 can be safely used by working around a number of issues in the specifications using server configuration or client implementations, and is currently the most widely used version. It is also possible to support TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 by using a new TLS library or cryptographic module, and users are able to use

secure versions without any additional hassle by updating their browser to the latest version. However, this does not change the fact that there are no fundamental solutions to some issues. Revisions and discussions are still being carried out regarding TLS 1.3 at the time of writing, in response to calls for fundamental fixes to a variety of vulnerability types in SSL/TLS. We offer a technological explanation of the TLS 1.3 draft later in this article.

Overview and Roles of SSL/TLS

The functions of SSL/TLS are (1) encryption of communications, (2) ensuring the integrity of data, and (3) server authentication (as well as client authentication in some cases). Located at the session layer, it is possible to provide the abovementioned security functions under a range of application layer protocols, such as HTTP, SMTP, and POP, without the need to implement mechanisms to ensure security for each of them. Because it has the advantage of not being dependent on the protocols of the application layer, it has been implemented widely.

Table 1: Differences in Status Based on Variance in SSL/TLS Versions

Protocol	Version	Status	Workaround	Basis	
	2.0	Vulnerable	N/A	RFC6167	
SSL	3.0	Vulnerable	N/A	RFC7568 (POODLE attack)	
		Issues present but	Do not use the renegotiation function	RFC5746	
	1.0	workarounds available (however, some issues have	Do not use the compression function	CRIME attack	
		no workaround)	1 : n-1 splitting	BEAST attack	
			Risk acceptance	Lucky-13 attack	
TLS	1.1	lssues present but workarounds available (however,	Do not use the compression function	CRIME attack	
	1.1	some issues have no workaround)	Risk acceptance	Lucky-13 attack	
		Issues present but	Do not use the compression function	CRIME attack	
	1.2	workarounds available	Only use GCM or CCM block cipher modes	Lucky-13 attack	
	1.3	(Under development to be secure)			

^{*46} See "SSL and TLS: Theory and Practice" by Rolf Oppliger for more information on the history and background for the formulation of SSL/TLS. The reasons the use of SSL is not recommended are summarized in the following two RFC. "RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6176), "RFC 7568: Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/7568).


^{*47 &}quot;RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/2246), "RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1" (https://tools. ietf.org/html/4346), "RFC5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/5246).


^{*48} IPA, "Cryptography Configurations Guideline for SSL/TLS Websites (- Cryptographic Configurations Edition)" (http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/ssl_crypt_ config.html) (in Japanese).

^{*49} Recommended settings can be found in the aforementioned Cryptography Configurations Guideline, the Mozilla project's "Security/Server Side TLS" (https:// wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS), or "RFC 7525: Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)" (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7525). "RFC 7457: Summarizing Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS)" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7457) also contains an overview of attacks to date.

Figure 15 shows the message flow in TLS 1.2. Pre-processing called the Handshake message takes place before the encryption of application data, consisting of a four-way flow. A brief explanation of the role of the Handshake message is given below. (1) A list of acceptable cipher suites (combinations of cryptographic algorithms) is sent from the client (browser) to the server. (2) The server selects the cipher suite considered best from among these, and sends notification via a ServerHello message, while also returning information such as the X.509 certificate required for server authentication and the public key, etc. required for key exchange to the client. (3) Because the client receives the server's public key, it can send information that only the server can decrypt. Once the server receives and decrypts this, it shares the Master Secret that all forms of key data are based on. Next, after sending a CCS (ChangeCipherSpec) message that indicates encryption will be used from that point on, the encrypted Finished message is sent. The server decrypts this, and checks the MAC data (data that ensures the integrity of a message) contained within to confirm that the messages sent and received up to that point have not been altered. (4) Finally, the server also sends a CCS and the encrypted Finished message, and the receiving client performs decryption and checks the MAC data in the same way that the server did, establishing a framework for sending and receiving application data securely.

Through the use of public key cryptosystems, the keys used for data encryption are generated in such a way that they are only known to the client and server, providing an encryption function. The MAC data also covers all the plain text data before the Finished message, so this provides a system for detecting alterations somewhere along the communication path. In addition, it is possible to carry out server and client authentication by confirming that the other node has the private key that corresponds to the public key presented in the X.509 certificate.





Only the "Message flow for full TLS Handshake" (also called 1-RTT) in the TLS 1.3 draft is shown in this figure. Discussions regarding the merge of CertificateRequest and CertificateVerify are ongoing, but ultimately it is likely they will be changed. Also note that some flows do not match this. In particular, for 0-RTT in which clients store EarlyDataIndication, a type of previously shared information, inside ClientHello for transmission, the flow differs greatly due to the fact that keys have already been shared. At IETF-94 it was proposed that client authentication be carried out after the Handshake, so even more variations are expected to appear. In the diagram, messages surrounded by a dotted line are optional, pink messages are encrypted with key data derived from the Ephemeral Secret.

In the diagram, messages bordered with a dotted line are optional, and orange messages indicate encryption has been carried out using key data derived from the Master Secret.

Figure 15: TLS 1.2 Message Flow



TLS 1.3

TLS 1.3^{*50} is still being revised and discussed at the time of writing. This is not a comparison with the final specification, but compared with TLS 1.2 or earlier, rather drastic changes such as those below are expected to be adopted.

- (1) Deprecation of compromised algorithms and block cipher modes.
- (2) Simplification of the message flow and encryption of the Handshake message.
- (3) Reorganization of pseudo-random number generation functions, and changes to the Master Secret calculation method and key derivation processes.

There are other changes besides those mentioned above, and it is clear that many improvements are being attempted. Engineers will be watching with interest to see how things develop. In Japan, events to review the latest draft have also been held led by CELLOS (Cryptographic protocol Evaluation toward Long-Lived Outstanding Society), and an effort has been made to send the results of these reviews to the TLS working group as feedback^{*51}.

Below, we give a brief overview of the changes listed above from a technological perspective.

(1) Deprecation of compromised algorithms and block cipher modes.

Cryptographic algorithms such as DES, MD5, and RC4 that are considered compromised will be deprecated^{*52}. There are moves to deprecate RC4 in particular independently of TLS 1.3 development, with major browser vendors already announcing they will disable support for RC4 early in 2016^{*53}. Of the SHA-1 and SHA-2 series of algorithms, SHA-224 will also be eliminated from use in signatures. However, as certificates using SHA-1 have not been completely eliminated from certificate chains that are traced to verify server certificates, talks aimed at finding a way to handle this are still ongoing. The CBC block cipher mode that led to attacks such as BEAST and POODLE will be deprecated, so only AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) will be used for symmetric key cryptography. The AEAD competition CAESAR^{*54} has been held since 2013, and is currently in the Round-2 phase. The winner(s) are set to be determined by around the end of 2017. It is not clear whether the results of CAESAR will be applied to TLS 1.3, but in the current draft version the ChaCha20-Poly1305^{*55} implementation of AEAD is listed as a mandatory algorithm alongside AES-GCM and AES-CCM^{*56}. Other symmetric key cryptographic algorithms listed include South Korea's ARIA and Japan's Camellia^{*57}. Going forward, it is expected that requests to list other algorithms will come flooding in, so the process by which the final selection will be made is expected to all come down to the details.

^{*50 &}quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3" (https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/), or "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/). At the time of writing, the latest edition of the draft is version 10.

^{*51} At a study group held four times between June and September, comments on the draft revision-08 were summarized and published (https://www.cellosconsortium.org/studygroup/tls_1_3-draft_08_issues_rev1.pdf). These comments were also posted to the TLS working group mailing list (http://www.ietf.org/ mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg17904.html). The current status of each can be reviewed on GitHub (https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/search?q=CELLOS& type=lssues&utf8=%E2%9C%93).

^{*52} DES was already deprecated in TLS 1.2. See "RFC 6151: Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms" (https:// tools.ietf.org/html/6151) for more information on the deprecation of MD5. Similarly, see "RFC 7465: Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites" (https://tools.ietf.org/ html/7465) for information on RC4.

^{*53} The RC4 NOMORE Attack (https://www.rc4nomore.com/) was disclosed at USENIX security'15 this summer, serving to hasten moves to deprecate RC4. Actions from major browser vendors were as follows, "Ending support for the RC4 cipher in Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer 11" (http://blogs.windows.com/ msedgedev/2015/09/01/ending-support-for-the-rc4-cipher-in-microsoft-edge-and-internet-explorer-11/), "Deprecating the RC4 Cipher" (https://blog.mozilla. org/security/2015/09/11/deprecating-the-rc4-cipher/), "Intent to deprecate: RC4" (https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/security-dev/ kVfCywocU08/vgi_rQuhKgAJ)

^{*54} Cryptographic competitions, "CAESAR: Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness" (http://competitions.cr.yp.to/ caesar.html).

^{*55 &}quot;RFC 7539: ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539).

^{*56 &}quot;RFC 5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288), "RFC 6655: AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655).

^{*57 &}quot;RFC 6209: Addition of the ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6209), "RFC 6367: Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6367).

Regarding public key cryptosystems, the DSA algorithm that relies on the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem for security was deprecated. DSA is not vulnerable at this point in time, but there has been a shift to use of ECDSA, which reduces cryptographic processing using elliptic curve operations (ECDSA is not the only solution for signatures, as the cipher suites that use RSA for encryption and digital signatures remain). Meanwhile, DH used for key exchange is still not deprecated, along with ECDH. When using DH and ECDH, only the DHE and ECDHE varieties that generate keys that change each time (ephemeral keys) to fulfill forward secrecy^{#58} are included on the cipher suites list. Regarding elliptic curve cryptography, based on discussion of pervasive monitoring^{*59} at the IETF in recent years, it is recommended that in addition to Curve^{*60} algorithms such as secp256r1 (Curve P-256) developed by NIST, the Curve25519^{*61} algorithm presented by D.J. Bernstein at PKC2006 should also be implemented. The debate surrounding Curve is expected to come up again as a hot topic at IETF-94 held in Yokohama, and SSR2015 (The 2nd International Conference on Research in Security Standardisation) held in Japan in December of this year^{*62}.

(2) Simplification of the message flow and encryption of the Handshake message.

Up until TLS 1.2, the Handshake involved clients sending a cipher suites list to the server, and the server selecting one of the methods sent. On the other hand, in TLS 1.3 this laborious behavior has been eliminated, and the client now begins by sending one cipher suite without offering a choice. This reduces the key sharing for encryption and guaranteeing the integrity of data from a four way process to a three way one, as shown in Figure 16. Furthermore, in TLS 1.2 and earlier the encryption took place from the Finished message, but in TLS 1.3 this has been changed so keys are prepared in advance, and part of the Handshake message is also encrypted before the Master Secret is shared.

(3) Reorganization of pseudo-random number generation functions, and changes to the Master Secret calculation method and key derivation processes.

When encrypting Handshake messages, key sharing is carried out using a key derivation function that employs HMAC, which is specified in RFC 5869. Along with this change, the derivation method for the Master Secret has also been significantly revised, with separate encryption keys used in each phase. At this time, we expect that keys known as the Static Secret and Ephemeral Secret will be generated in advance along with the Master Secret, and used in steps to encrypt the Handshake message. The Master Secret is also designed to be generated from these two advance keys. Furthermore, although the actual keys used for symmetric key cryptography are derived from these three pieces of key data, because AEAD carries out encryption and MAC (message authentication code) assignment at the same time, the MAC key generation process has been eliminated.

^{*58} IIJ IIR Vol.22 "1.4.2 Forward Secrecy" (http://www.iij.ad.jp/en/company/development/iir/pdf/iir_vol22_EN.pdf).

^{*59 &}quot;RFC 7258: Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7258).

^{*60} National Institute of Standards and Technology, "FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)" (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf).

^{*61 &}quot;A state-of-the-art Diffie-Hellman function" (http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html).

^{*62} At SSR2015 (http://ssr2015.com/), which is to be held in Tokyo in December, it is expected that the topic of cryptographic algorithm selection including Curves will be discussed. The subject of revisions to RFC4492 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492), which regulates cipher suites related to elliptic curves, was discussed at IETF-94 (https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tls-0.pdf). The upgrade of the RSA signature format was also touched upon at the same conference. More specifically, the topic was the upgrade of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (defined in PKCS#1 version 1.5) to RSASSA-PSS (https://tools.ietf.org/ html/rfc3447) (https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tls-4.pdf).



This demonstrates that a variety of approaches are being evaluated, and transparent discussions about whether TLS 1.3 is really a secure protocol are still underway. Another direction being explored is the attempts to verify whether a given protocol is secure using formal verification tools such as ProVerif^{*63}. In the same way that descriptions of provable security are required when a new cryptographic algorithm is proposed, we may come to similar common understanding for secure protocols as well.

Eliminating Factors that Trigger Implementation Issues

When it comes to using cryptographic algorithms or pseudo-random number generator modules, there are issues with the actual implementers not being aware of things the designer considers obvious. Some examples of this are issues with the reuse of public keys when the private key has been shared unintentionally, and implementations in which the data encryption key is hard coded, and the same key used for encryption every time^{*64}. In addition to discrepancies occurring upon implementation, the lack of consensus is considered to be a primary factor that triggers vulnerabilities. Another issue is the fact that specifications such as RFC are written in natural language, so there is a certain degree of ambiguity to them, and some implementers may interpret them differently. We will need to evaluate the documentation and composition of the TLS 1.3 draft with this in mind. Consequently, in addition to removing unnecessary parts of the protocols themselves, we believe that any ambiguity in the descriptions within should also be removed.

1.5 Conclusion

This report has provided a summary of security incidents to which IIJ has responded. In this report, we examined route hijacking and the latest status of TLS 1.3. IIJ makes every effort to inform the public about the dangers of Internet usage by identifying and publicizing incidents and associated responses in reports such as this.



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Hirohide Tsuchiya (1.2 Incident Summary) Hirohide Tsuchiya, Tadaaki Nagao, Hiroshi Suzuki, Hisao Nashiwa (1.3 Incident Survey) Yoshinobu Matsuzaki, Technology Planning Office, Network Division, IIJ (1.4.1 Route Hijacking) Yuji Suga (1.4.2 The Latest Status of TLS 1.3) Office of Emergency Response and Clearinghouse for Security Information, Service Operation Division, IIJ

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*63 Arai, Watanabe, Sakurada, Formal Verification of the TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol Using ProVerif, 3C2-1, Computer Security Symposium 2015 (http://www.iwsec. org/css/2015/program.htm#i3C2) (in Japanese). There have also been reports of attacks on TLS 1.3 using other verification tools (https://www.ietf.org/mailarchive/web/tls/current/msg18215.html)

*64 See the following PKI Day 2012 presentation materials (http://www.jnsa.org/seminar/pki-day/2012/data/PM02_suga.pdf) (in Japanese) or CRYPTREC Symposium 2015 materials (http://cryptrec.go.jp/topics/cryptrec_20150424_symposium2015_presentation.html) (in Japanese) for more information. There is also a method that takes into account the misuse of random data (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6979). For DSA and ECDSA, random data is required each time for signing. However, there are moves to reduce implementation errors by making this deterministic depending on the data subject to signature.

IIJ Initiatives Following the Advent of IP-Enabled Broadcast Equipment

The Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be held just five years from now. Five years ahead may seem like a lot of time, but the athletes that wish to compete there must incorporate each and every year into their strategy. Outside the world of sports, the same could be said for the systems supporting the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Prime examples of this are the 4K and 8K broadcasts that are currently being pushed from the experimental towards mainstream adoption. Unlike the Internet, where the pace of development is said to be measured in dog years, the evolution of legacy broadcasting systems requires time, coordination, and innovation. Here we will examine the advent of IP-enabled devices, which are making waves in the world of broadcasting.

Below we show a diagram of a broadcasting system, using sports relay broadcasts as an example (Figure 1). Footage of events held at stadiums or other venues must of course be shot and recorded. It is then necessary to transfer the footage shot at the venue to the broadcaster so that it can be made into a program and provided for broadcast or online streaming. When broadcasting at a later date, you can simply transport the memory card or hard disk from the camera the footage was shot on, but this is not possible for relay broadcasts. As video editing (the addition of captions, etc.) is also carried out at the broadcasting office, video must be transferred to the broadcaster in real time while retaining the highest quality possible. Broadcasters use a range of techniques to achieve this. Typically, base stations and relay stations for microwave or satellite relay are set up. Cheap, consumer access lines are used for devices such as weather cameras, and in emergencies mobile carrier data communication is also sometimes employed. Another alternative is purchasing a dedicated line service for video from a communications carrier. Generally, more stable methods are preferred when the emphasis is on quality, while portability is preferred when speedy reporting is a higher priority. This form of networking, in a broad sense, is called "contribution" in the industry. In contrast, the delivery of footage from the broadcaster to viewers by way of terrestrial waves, BS, CS, or OTT is known as "distribution."

The physical media used for contribution and for transfer within broadcasting offices is the coaxial cable. This is the same technology that connects the antenna to your TV at home. The coaxial cable was invented in the 19th century, and it excels at the transmission of high frequency signals. It was once even used for Ethernet for a time (10BASE2, 10BASE5). This technology is also still widely used in the radio and video fields. At broadcasters it has been used to transmit video since the old analog days, and to this day it handles the transmission of full HD video via a standard called SDI (Serial Digital Interface).




Figure 1: Broadcaster-Centric Contribution and Distribution



There are moves to seek a successor for stable technology like this that is past its prime, stemming from the shift to 4K and 8K broadcast video. These video formats result in extremely large volumes of data when compression is not used. For example, 4K uses four times as much data as full HD video. Currently, transmitting 4K video by coaxial cable would involve dividing the screen into four quadrants, resulting in the need for four coaxial cables. Coaxial cables are heavy and hard to handle, so if four of them were required, it would certainly be more difficult to manage them. It has also been pointed out that coaxial cables would be stretched to the limit with respect to the high frequency characteristics required to transmit large amounts of data such as 4K/8K video signals.

As a result, the focus has shifted to optical fiber. This technology has spread like wildfire in the communications industry over the past decade or so. It is used for the internal wiring of NOC and data centers, as well as in home network connections, as demonstrated by the term "FTTH," which stands for "fiber to the home." As it is less likely to be affected by electromagnetic waves, and more than capable of transmitting large amounts of data, it is being used in broadcasting and video devices more and more these days. As indicated by the "SDI" (serial digital interface) standard name, the video signal is digital data, so in a sense the barrier between broadcasting and data communication has already been broken down. It is said that in the near future fiber will take the place of the physical media used for transmission with broadcast equipment.

The adoption of optical fiber in broadcasting and communication devices will also trigger further changes to upper layer protocols. Until now SDI was considered a key component of broadcasters and their ecosystems, but more and more people are suggesting that broadcasting ecosystems will eventually migrate to IP-based systems. At the International Broadcasting Convention (IBC) held in Amsterdam in September 2013, one company displayed posters on site proclaiming in large letters that "SDI must die." In a way, this message could be interpreted as self-rejection of the industry, but I remember feeling a sense of anticipation for the upcoming technology that is set to blaze new trails in the near future.

In the U.S., broadcasting standards are determined by an organization called the SMPTE (Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers). The SMPTE has begun recommending "SDI over IP" technology in its standards. These are discussed and evaluated by an industry group called the Video Services Forum (Table 1).

Standard	Title
SMPTE 2022-1	Forward Error Correction for Real-Time Video/Audio Transport Over IP Networks
SMPTE 2022-2	Unidirectional Transport of Constant Bit Rate MPEG-2 Transport Streams on IP Networks
SMPTE 2022-3	Unidirectional Transport of Variable Bit Rate MPEG-2 Transport Streams on IP Networks
SMPTE 2022-4	Unidirectional Transport of Non-Piecewise Constant Variable Bit Rate MPEG-2 Streams on IP Networks
SMPTE 2022-5	Forward Error Correction for High Bit Rate Media Transport Over IP Networks
SMPTE 2022-6	Transport of High Bit Rate Media Signals over IP Networks (HBRMT)
SMPTE 2022-7	Seamless Protection Switching of SMPTE ST 2022 IP Datagrams

Table 1: SMPTE Standard 2022 Series Titles

Products supporting the SMPTE 2022 standards have rapidly increased over the past year. They continued to gain momentum at the NAB Show held in Las Vegas in April 2015, as well as at the IBC held in Amsterdam in September this year. Leading broadcast equipment manufacturers such as Sony, Evertz Microsystems (Canada), and Grass Valley (United States) have all adopted SMPTE 2022, not only due to the standards supporting 4K/8K, but also because they sense the potential of video transmission using IP networks, and want to lead the industry in that field. In Japan, companies such as Sony, Media Global Links, and PFU have also begun supporting SMPTE 2022.

This kind of "SDI over IP" will first start from local areas. I believe that the scope will be limited at first, only covering individual chassis or racks. That said, coverage will soon go beyond the rack, until an SDI over IP network in the form of a local area network that spans an entire floor is realized. This is the scope covered by the coaxial cable networks that IP networks are set to replace.

However, the true potential of IP networks lies in internetworking. In most cases, office and campus networks over a certain size are generally comprised of a number of interconnected networks. When networks are associated with a variety of groups and purposes, dividing up the network clarifies its usage, allowing people to connect without sacrificing user-friendliness. The exact same thing could be said of video networks. Remote networking is another major advantage that IP networks have. This allows remote locations and local area networks to be interconnected. The Internet is a typical example of this, and it goes without saying that this opens up new worlds of possibility for video networks as well.

Transmitting uncompressed 4K video over IP networks is no easy task. For 13 Gbps of bandwidth, two 10 gigabit Ethernet lines would be required. That is where compression technology comes into play. Currently, the JPEG 2000 (J2K) format is popular in Europe and the United States. This is a lossy compression format, but it is said to achieve "visually lossless" compression with about 800 Mbps of bandwidth. Bringing the bandwidth under 1 Gbps makes the IP transmission of 4K video a real possibility. The use of two 10 gigabit Ethernet lines would entail enormous costs, but making a 1 gigabit Ethernet line viable enables the selection of multiple reasonable services using low-cost network devices.

The potential of IP networks has already been explored with weather camera transmissions and on-the-spot broadcasts using portable networks. Relay broadcasts from remote locations that were either expensive or somewhat limited in the past will soon be easily achievable. In fact, devices such as weather cameras are now growing in popularity as equipment for casual users. Systems integrators combine components that already exist around the world, rather than designing large-scale systems themselves. This approach is commonly seen in the Internet age. I think the ongoing success of this approach has led to the dynamic shift towards IP-enabled broadcast devices.



From the perspective of broadcast equipment manufacturers, the move to IP-enabled devices has created an urgent need to choose a way forward, as they must incorporate new technology such as fiber optics and IP in addition to the SDI technology they already have experience with. IP ties into the key components of broadcast equipment, so the question of how to tackle it is probably tricky to answer. Broadcast equipment features devices called routers that are separate from the IP components. As the name suggests, these determine the pairing of video sources and destinations, and it is necessary to construct the video routing function at a level above the IP switch device. This requires in-depth knowledge of both application layers and transport layers.

One company taking an aggressive approach is Evertz Microsystems. They have advocated a concept known as the "Software Defined Video Network (SDVN)" for the past few years, and they are making progress with the implementation of IP technology on their equipment. Although it borrows from previous concepts, they are really creating an SDN for themselves. This intrigued me, and I took the opportunity to interview engineers in charge of SDVN at Evertz Microsystems. They originally worked in video engineering, but told me they began acquiring Ethernet and IP technology from around 2010 as part of company policy. I believe they have the advantage of being able to comprehensively design and implement IP and video layers.

Meanwhile, at the NAB Show in 2015, Grass Valley announced they were partnering with Cisco Systems, a leader in the network industry. Many manufacturers also partnered up with companies like Juniper Networks and Arista Networks. The general feeling is that it will be better when IP network devices, which are now fully commoditized, are usable in a casual manner. Rather than developing IP technology in-house, it is more desirable to be paired with multifunctional, mass-produced devices. This is certainly an insightful outlook. Above all, this is a logical approach to IP networks.

One thing that must be considered is whether there are any discrepancies between how each IP network device manufacturer and broadcast equipment manufacturer envisages IP networks. IP networks have prospered because they were generic. Email, Internet, and streaming can all be accessed from the same IP network device. Meanwhile, in the extreme, broadcast equipment manufacturers are looking for IP networks that prevent broadcast accidents from occurring. That leads to a large gap in understanding. Routing protocols are used to implement redundancy on IP networks. This makes it possible to switch over to a backup or bypass routes when communications are interrupted. When browsing the Web or using video chat, for example, this process is usually invisible to the user. However, in the world of SDI over IP where a constant 60 frames per second is required, the switchover may be jarring.

In the broadcasting industry, an active-active "Line A/Line B" configuration is used. Applying this to SDI over IP would involve transmitting Line A and Line B feeds of JPEG 2000 4K video in parallel, with the receiver adopting one signal or the other. For the most critical purposes, a configuration like this is the only option. However, this Line A/Line B system has the disadvantage of requiring double the investment in equipment. The challenge is to come up with a configuration that takes advantage of the casual nature of IP networks. Striking a balance between the benefits of networks and SDI over IP poses another problem.

Of course, target-oriented IP networks have also been created. One example of this would be the trading networks that process online transactions at the nanosecond level. I believe the question of whether or not IP networks that meet these extremely high level demands are attainable can only be answered by IP network device manufacturers, as well as network service providers like IIJ.

In light of this, IIJ began proof-of-concept tests for SDI over IP, with the goal of creating a commercial service based on SMPTE 2022. Of course, we used our own backbone for these tests. We tried multiplexing this kind of mission critical video traffic over our backbone, which already carries the traffic for our other customers. A dedicated line is not used, so the traffic receives no special treatment. Consequently, we decided to perform the tests over sections with spare bandwidth (Figure 2).

In both cases, video was input and output at 4K60p. However, each manufacturer uses different encoding. This comes down to a difference in how much of a penalty developers consider the time required to compress and decompress video to be. Either way, this is only an extremely short delay (a few frames), but for the purpose of broadcasting, faster is always better. The difficult part is deciding where to set the minimum requirements, as technical requirements in the broadcasting industry often have a sensory aspect to them.

For test 1, a virtual Layer 2 Network was constructed over the IIJ backbone, and the route was set as Tokyo to Osaka, and back to Tokyo again. From applications this looks like a private network, but the traffic itself is multiplexed over the IIJ backbone. The transmitter and receiver were actually in the same location, but the network encompassed a remote location (Osaka). We were able to transmit an extremely large amount of data, at 3.5 Gbps, without any issues at all. Although there was some network




Figure 2: SDI Over IP Tests Using the IIJ Backbone



latency (about 23 ms), the overall latency between the transmitting video player and the receiving monitor appeared to be just a single frame. At 4K, there were 60 frames per second (59.94 frames, strictly speaking), which works out to 16.7 ms per frame. End-to-end transmission was completed within 33.4 ms, so we were able to achieve the low latency performance we had aimed for. Although the system worked as it had been designed, we were frankly surprised by this result.

For test 2, we used the Internet for all sections. Through coordination with the Cyber Kansai Project, an academic-industrial collaboration, we set up a transmitter in Osaka. 4K video was sent via the CKP internal network, and over the IIJ backbone from Osaka to Tokyo, before being output at the IIJ office. These communications were carried out using a global IPv4 address. We actually observed a negligible amount of packet loss, but we confirmed the technology was able to cover this.

In the future, we believe that SDI over IP will continue to gain traction, riding the crest of a new wave of technology. However, the ecosystem to support it must still be prepared. When broadcasters leave behind their familiar, reliable technology, and seek new options, what will the requirements be? With the Internet now a global force, and broadcasters seeking to take advantage of it, how should contribution and distribution systems be prepared? We believe the knowledge we have gained through developing, promoting, and operating IP technology in the Internet world is sure to play a vital role.



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Mr. Yamamoto is a Senior Engineer in the Product Promotion Department Corporate Planning Section of the Product Division, IIJ. He joined IIJ Media Communications in 1995 and has worked at IIJ since 2005. He is mainly involved with the development of streaming technology. Among his contributions to development of the market is the organization of the Streams-JP Mailing List, which discusses this technology.

Internet Topics Modular Data Center Developments

The overall electricity demand of data centers is forecast to increase worldwide between 2015 and 2020, with an expected average annual growth rate of 4.2% in Europe, 5.8% in North America, 6.8% in APAC, 10.6% in the Middle East and Africa, and 11.2% in Central and South America. The market for modular data centers is also forecast to expand by 23.2%, which is more than double the growth rate for data centers as a whole. In such a favorable environment, the co-IZmo/I modular data center developed by IIJ is beginning to establish a significant presence in the growing Japanese and international data center markets.

New Module Development

The market for data centers, in particular modular data centers, is expected to continue growing over the next few years. To embrace this market, IIJ developed co-IZmo/I ("co" stands for compact, and "I" refers to indirect outside air cooling) (Figure 1). Co-IZmo/I was developed based on the knowledge we accumulated through the operation of IZmo modules, which are used as commercial infrastructure for our cloud services at Matsue Data Center Park. IZmo modules are the first modular data centers that fully utilize outside air cooling and realize high energy efficiency, not only in Japan but in the Asian region. The design and development of these IZmo series products incorporate the expertise in areas such as cooling control and internal facility structures unique to data centers that we have acquired through our experience in operating and using data centers. The fact that IIJ's IZmo series are developed based on experience differentiates IIJ's products from other modular data centers, giving us a competitive advantage. Co-IZmo/I modules, in easily-transportable 20-foot containers (about six meters long), adopt a cooling system that indirectly uses outside air, providing superior energy saving performance while also allowing installation in areas where the air outside is not very clean. By housing cooling modules and electrical equipment such as batteries used in the event of power outages in a single module, we have been able to cut back on installation time and reduce costs. It is also easy to scale out by linking multiple modules, enabling their use in medium to large data center construction.

Customer Deployment

In 2014, we delivered four modular data center units to a research organization in Japan, and one to a company in Russia. Our business with the Russian company began when they contacted us directly after seeing our products mentioned by overseas media. They wanted to install a backup system for plant control, and chose to adopt our product after recognizing its superior quality compared to competitor products, and placing value on the fact that we have actually had several dozen modules in commercial-level operation at Matsue for a long time (Figure 2).

For transportation to Russia, a container ship was used between the Port of Yokohama and Vladivostok, after which the module was taken by trailer to its ultimate destination in an industrial city several hundred kilometers away from Moscow (Figure 3). Although co-IZmo/I is durable enough to withstand stacking, the shock caused to it when it is dropped by crane onto a ship would be too great, so it was transported in a horizontal configuration. We also looked into using the Trans-Siberian Railway for overland freight in Russia, but decided to go with a trailer in the end. Although there were unexpected complications, including a delay of several weeks in the Lake Baikal area due to bad weather, co-IZmo/I has been operating stably up to now in a severe environment that reaches minus 30 degrees Celsius in the winter.

Marketing Activities

During fiscal year 2015 we bolstered our overseas marketing activities with the aim of cultivating the global market. As part of this we attended trade shows in Hong Kong in July, Singapore in September, and Hungary in October, and we are currently engaged in business talks with several companies and public institutions in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. Their needs vary widely.

- Some desire to build a data center for IT business in a short period of time to start operations quickly
- Some desire to place small-scale data centers in a number of distributed locations to improve reliability
- Some desire to build a high quality data center as a platform system for a public institution



Figure 1: co-IZmo/I



Figure 2: Matsue Data Center Park



Internet Topics

We believe the acclaim co-IZMO/I has received is due to the fact that it allows for the quick assembly of high quality data centers with little need to secure skilled personnel for special facility design and construction as with building-type data centers.

At the trade show in Singapore, we were able to get a broad sense of the demand for modular data centers in Southeast Asia, such as their use as backups for existing server rooms, and IT consulting firms that wish to provide them to companies in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Myanmar. We didn't see this level of demand when attending the Hong Kong trade show in July, confirming that Singapore is the center for data centers and other economic activities in Southeast Asia as a whole, and the region shows great potential. At the trade show in Hungary, there were many corporate and government attendees from African, Central European, and Middle Eastern countries. The adaptability of our product to harsh environments that go up to more than 40 degrees Celsius or minus 40 degrees Celsius attracted a great deal of interest, as did the commercial use of Matsue Data Center Park and the easy to scale-out functionality.

At the trade show held in Singapore in September, co-IZmo/I and the NEC IA server Express5800 series were jointly awarded with the DatacenterDynamics Converged Critical Environment Future Thinking Award for 2015^{*1}, providing even more momentum to IIJ's marketing activities. I think this will raise the profile of co-IZmo/I and lead to increased recognition of its reliability and quality.

Future Activities

We believe that modular data centers will play an increasing role in future usage scenarios, including use as distributed processing infrastructure for IoT and as cache for video streaming networks. To this date, IIJ has focused on providing IT services such as Internet access, system integration, operation outsourcing, and network and data center housing services. However, by providing modular data centers, we are expanding our business into the area of data center facility construction, a service we were previously unable to offer. In addition to facilities, we are also pursuing the development of services and technology for providing internal IT systems, network services, and data center operation as a one-stop solution. With co-IZmo/I gaining ground both in Japan and around the world, from this fiscal year we began offering options for its integrated management and operation from Matsue Data Center Park. We will continue to pursue such business initiatives in developing new technologies that open up new doors in the constantly changing IT market.



Figure 3: Shipment from Module Factory > Loading on Container Ship at the Port of Yokohama > Container Ship En Route to Vladivostok from the Port of Yokohama > On-site Installation Work



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*1 The Critical Environment Future Thinking Award is presented to commend technological innovations and initiatives that represent next-generation, state-of-the-art data center solutions. Combining co-IZmo/I with NEC's Express5800 series modular rack-based servers, which guarantee operation at 40 degrees Celsius, provides superior energy saving performance in hot and humid climates such as Southeast Asia. This configuration also accommodates the high-density implementation and easy scale-out required by cloud services. These acclaimed features led to us being presented with the award.



About Internet Initiative Japan Inc. (IIJ)

IJJ was established in 1992, mainly by a group of engineers who had been involved in research and development activities related to the Internet, under the concept of promoting the widespread use of the Internet in Japan.

IJJ currently operates one of the largest Internet backbones in Japan, manages Internet infrastructures, and provides comprehensive high-quality system environments (including Internet access, systems integration, and outsourcing services, etc.) to high-end business users including the government and other public offices and financial institutions.

In addition, IJJ actively shares knowledge accumulated through service development and Internet backbone operation, and is making efforts to expand the Internet used as a social infrastructure.

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